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The Demand for Unilateral Secession in Catalonia: While
the Cause is Compelling, Secession Would Not Be Legal
Under International Law
Logan Hayes

Introduction
Tensions between Catalonia and Spain have finally boiled over,
leading to Catalonia’s decision to unilaterally secede from Spain. On
October 1, 2017, an overwhelming 90% of voters chose to leave
Spain in a referendum held by the Catalonian parliament.1 On October 10, 2017, Carles Puigdemont, President of Catalonia, gave a
speech claiming that “with the results of the referendum on October
first, Catalonia has earned the right to be an independent state.”2 The
issue has now become whether Catalonia has the right, under international law, to maintain their unilateral secession from Spain in order
to form their own independent nation. This confrontation between
Spain and Catalonia will force another international discussion on
which situations may allow one part of a larger state to secede and
become a new state.
The Supreme Court of Canada addressed the issue of unilateral
secession in 1998 when Quebec attempted, but failed, to secede from
Canada.3 The International Court of Justice (hereinafter “ICJ”) also
addressed this topic in 1999 when it was determined that Kosovo had
1.

Sam Jones, Stephen Burgen and agencies, Catalan referendum: preliminary results
show 90% in favour of independence, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/dozens-injured-as-riot-police-stormcatalan-ref-polling-stations (nothing that it was during this vote that at more than 800
people as well as 33 police officers were hurt due to violent aids led by Spanish police).
2.
Official statement by the President, Carles Puigdemont, on the political situation in
Catalonia (Oct. 10, 2017) (on file with the Generalitat de Catalunya),
http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsvp/AppJava/notapremsavw/303582/ca
/official-statement-by-the-president-political-situation-in-catalonia.do (Puigdemont hoped
that “the conflict between Catalonia and the Spanish state can be resolved in a manner
that is serene and with accord, respecting the will of the people.”).
3.
Judicial and Similar Proceedings Supreme Court of Canada: Reference Re Secession
of Quebec, Nov. 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1340 (1998) [Hereinafter Reference Re Secession of
Quebec].
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the right to declare independence through unilateral secession from
Serbia.4 The analyses of these two major court decisions can highlight which principles typically govern the court on matters of unilateral secession. It is important, however, to note that these examples
would merely be persuasive in determining the legality of Catalonia’s
decision to unilaterally secede from Spain.
This comment explores whether Catalonia’s unilateral secession
would be deemed legal in the realm of international law. Both the
Canadian Supreme Court and the ICJ focused their analyses on two
concepts: (1) the right to self-determination; and (2) territorial integrity. The Canadian Supreme Court, in addressing the right to selfdetermination, found that it is only applicable in instances where
people were “denied meaningful access to government to pursue their
political, economic, cultural and social development” through oppression.5 The Canadian Supreme Court also found that the concept
of territorial integrity prohibits a unilateral declaration of independence unless it is authorized by that state’s constitution.6 Quebec was
denied the right to a unilateral declaration of independence as they
did not meet the aforementioned criteria. The ICJ, in addressing the
declaration of independence by Kosovo, found that not only did Kosovo not violate international law,7 but that the principal of territorial
integrity did not prohibit unilateral declarations of independence.8 In
applying the analyses and conclusions regarding both Quebec and
Kosovo, it is clear that Catalonia cannot legally secede from Spain
through a unilateral declaration of independence. The rulings made in
Quebec and Kosovo are not binding, but can offer insight into how
the international arena has addressed this issue in the past. Until there

4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

United Nations Mission in Kosovo, On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional
Self-Government in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001).
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3 (A unilateral declaration of independence is the first step to achieving unilateral secession).
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3 (Each nation attempting to secede
must follow different steps that are dependent upon the requirements within the constitution).
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010
I.C.J. Rep. 403 (July 22),
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf
[hereinafter Accordance].
Accordance, supra note 7.
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is a true legal evaluation, the Catalans will continue to spread unrest
throughout Spain and the issue will go unresolved.

Background Facts and Legal Doctrine
The Catalonian Crisis
A Formerly Oppressed Country Seeks Independence
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 established a framework for “a
process of devolution of power;” authorizing Spain to be divided into
seventeen self-governing Comunidades Autónomas.9 Each community runs its own regional parliament and government; granting them a
substantial amount of political power.10 Of these regions, Catalonia
proved to have the strongest nationalist sentiment and greatest desire
for autonomy throughout Spain’s history.11 In 1979, Catalonia
achieved self-governance by passing a Statute of Autonomy, later
updated in
2005.12 This new Statute inspired Catalans to believe that they
had the “right to decide.”13 Catalans view the “right to decide” as “the
right to actually choose by themselves, in a unilateral manner, whether they want Catalonia to remain in Spain.”14 Catalans hoped negotiating with Spanish authorities would facilitate a smoother transition if
they decided they wanted independence.15
According to Catalan secessionists, Spanish authorities violated
the political agreement contained within the Spanish Constitution of
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Víctor Ferreres Comella, The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s
‘Right to Decide’ (Comment on the Judgment 42/2014), 10 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 571–
590 (2014).
Id.
Id.
Comella, supra note 9, at 572 (Changes were made with the intent to reduce tensions
between the Spanish Constitution and the 1979 Statute of Autonomy).
Id. (The “right to decide” being the right to self-determination through a unilateral
secession from Spain).
Id.
Id. (“The space for negotiation with the Spanish authorities would be larger, of
course, if the referendum were understood to be a mere expression of opinion, and not
the exercise of a political power to decide an issue unilaterally. If the referendum were
simply an instrument to test the political waters in Catalonia with regard to the status
of this region in Spain, secession would not be the only way out of the problem, even
if most people voted in favour of it. A new institutional arrangement that changed the
form and amount of self-government in Catalonia would also be part of the menu, as a
political answer to the dissatisfaction expressed by citizens.”).
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1978.16 They often say the Constitution is “politically dead” because
the Spanish government has not adhered to the “spirit of the document.”17 This Catalan secessionist opinion is deeply rooted in the
Spanish Constitutional Court’s 2010 decision, which invalidated the
2006 Statute of Autonomy because it failed to explicitly define Catalonia as a “nation.”18 The original Preamble of the 2006 Statute of
Autonomy claimed that Catalonia was a nation, even going so far as
to acknowledge Catalonia as a “nationality.”19 As a result, in 2010,
the Spanish Constitutional Court weakened the final version of the
text that the Spanish legislative assembly produced, which was not so
explicit.20 This is important because under Article 2 of the Spanish
Constitution, the term ‘nationality’ “grants self-government to the
′nationalities and regions′ that exist in Spain.”21 The Court explained
that it “didn’t mean to” deny Catalonia’s legitimacy as an independent nation.22 However, the Spanish Constitutional Court determined
that, both legally and constitutionally speaking, only Spain is a na16.

17.

18.

19.

20.
21.

22.

Comella, supra note 9, at 573 (The political parties in Catalonia have created a narrative on “this process of ‘national transition,’” which has greatly impacted Catalan public opinions).
Id. (The Court’s 2010 decision was almost unanimous to the extent that the provisions
were found to be defective under the Spanish Constitution. This decision was reached
both by the majority opinion judges and the dissenting judges. Essentially, the dissenters agreed with the majority, but would have invalidated more proposed provisions.
Thus, in addressing the validity of the articles that were ultimately declared unconstitutional, the court essentialy agreed).
Id. (In the original draft prepared by the Catalan Parliament, they explicitly defined
themselves as a nation. However, through editing and rewriting the statute, that
straightforward language was lost. Under Spain’s constitution a region like Catalonia
would be considered an autonomous community, SPANISH CONST. Dec. 27, 1978, art.
147).
Id. (“The Preamble [of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy] was therefore to be read in
light of the Constitution, so that any suggestion that Catalonia is a nation had to be excluded. The Court explained that its analysis was exclusively legal: it did not mean to
deny the legitimacy of viewing Catalonia as a nation from historical, linguistic, cultural, sociological or other perspectives. Still, the Court was probably too strict when it
insisted on the legal impossibility of defining Catalonia as a nation.”).
Id. (This appeal to Spanish Constitutional Court because a political party, called the
Partido Popular, wanted to challenge the legitimacy of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy).
Comella, supra note 9 at 574 (The Court found that the expression “Spain, a nation of
nations,” as seen in the Spanish Constitution, should be interpreted to show the “cultural pluralism that characterizes Spain.” The Court ultimately determined that “the
Constitution only knows of the existence of the Spanish nation,” with no indication
that its autonomous communities could be considered nations).
Id.
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tion.23 Catalan secessionists believed that the 2006 Statute of Autonomy was going to be a “new constitutional pact ′between Catalonia
and Spain,′ which the Court ought to have respected.”24 This ruling
prompted Catalans protests and declarations that: “We are a nation.
We decide.”25
The Invalidation of Sovereignty Leads to the Unofficial Referendum of 2014
On January 23, 2013, the Catalonian parliament passed a Declaration of Sovereignty, which the Constitutional Court proceeded to
partially invalidate.26 In response to the Constitutional Court’s partial
invalidation, the Catalonian parliament held an unofficial referendum
on November 9, 2014 to determine the “true will” of the people.27
This referendum posed two questions to Catalans: (1) Do you want
Catalonia to be a state? (2) Do you want that state to be independent?28 The people’s answer was a clear “yes” to both of those ques-

23.
24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

Id.
Id. (“According to this understanding, if Catalans voted for independence, negotiations with the Spanish authorities would ensue, in order to work out the details of the
process of secession. But secession as such would be for Catalans to decide.”).
Id. (The “secessionist movement has been able to mobilize a large section of the citizenry in Catalonia. Its goal is for this territory to break its ties with Spain, and thus become a new independent state. A powerful association (the Assemblea Nacional Catalana) has organized several demonstrations in the streets. The most spectacular ones
have taken place in the context of the festivity of the Catalan Diada Nacional, which is
celebrated on 11 September every year. In 2012, the association gathered many people
in Barcelona under the banner, ′Catalonia, the next European state′. The following
year, it organized a human chain in favour of independence, which ran from the north
of Catalonia to the south. These events showed that the movement had strong popular
support.”).
Comella, supra note 9, at 577-8 (The Declaration of Sovereignty, also known as
Resolution 5/X of the Catalonian Parliament, approved the declaration of sovereign
entity and agreed “to initiate the process to exercise the right to decide so that the citizens of Catalonia may decide their collective political future in accordance with the
following principles: sovereignty, democratic legitimacy, transparency, dialogue, social cohesion, Europeanism, legality, role of Catalan Parliament and participation.”).
Catalonia vote: 80% back independence - officials, BBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29982960 (noting that this vote was nonbinding, more than two million people out of a possible 5.4 million eligible voters participated).
Id.
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tions.29 Of the 2.2 million people that participated, an overwhelming
80% wanted Catalonia to declare independence from Spain.30
On March 25, 2014, the Spanish Constitutional Court announced
its ruling on the Catalan Declaration of Sovereignty.31 The Constitutional Court invalidated the “principle of sovereignty” within the
Declaration, but upheld “the right to decide.”32 In invalidating the
“principle of sovereignty,” parliament did not indicate that constitutional reforms would have to be adopted to extend that right beyond
Spain to the nations within.33 The Spanish Constitutional Court determined that sovereignty was not an option for Catalonia, as the
Declaration clearly affirmed that the Catalan people are already sovereign.34 It is for those reasons, that the Court determined it had no
option but to invalidate the “principle of sovereignty,” which would
have granted Catalans the authority to create and sustain its own government by the consent of its own people.35
In the affirming of the “right to decide”, the Spanish Constitutional Court stated that if the Catalan right to decide was exercised in
accordance with the existing legal framework, then they had no con29.
30.

31.
32.

33.

34.

35.

Id.
Id. (“Opinion polls suggest[ed] that as many as 80% of Catalans want[ed] an official
referendum on the issue of Catalonia’s status, with about 50% in favour of full independence”).
Id. (after it had been provisionally suspended on May 8, 2013).
Comella, supra note 9, at 577 (“The procedure the Spanish government used is regulated in Art. 161.2 of the Constitution, as well as in Arts. 76 and 77 of the Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitutional. When the government resorts to this procedure, in order
to attack norms or acts adopted by the Autonomous Communities, the Constitutional
Court must suspend the effects of the challenged norm or act. The Court can afterwards decide to lift the suspension.”).
Id. (“Under Art. 150.2 of the Spanish Constitution, it is possible for the Spanish parliament, by means of an organic statute, to delegate or transfer certain state competences to the Autonomous Communities. Such a statute can fix the forms of control
that the state is to retain. There is a limit, however, to the use of this mechanism: the
competence involved ′must be of a nature that makes it susceptible to being transferred
or delegated′. There is interpretive controversy as to the scope of this abstract constraint.”).
Id. (The Court pointed out that Article 1 of the Spanish Constitution states that national sovereignty is given to the Spanish people. The Spanish people exercise constituent
power, which runs all state structures. Article 2 asserts that the Spanish Constitution
rests on the indissoluble unity of Spain. The Court highlighted that the Catalan people,
legally speaking, could not be sovereign. This is because their sovereignty would
cause the denial of the sovereignty of the Spanish people. The Court concluded that
two sovereignties could not legally coexist).
Id.
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stitutional objection.36 The Court determined that Spain was not a
“militant democracy: all political programs can be defended in the
public sphere.”37 The implementation of those political programs
merely need to observe existing laws of legal change.38 The Court
found that the “right to decide” was a “political ‘aspiration,’” which
can only be realized in following all applicable legal and Constitutional procedures.39 From this decision the Catalans struggled to determine how the “right to decide” can be maintained if the “principle
of sovereignty” is invalidated.40
The 2017 Spanish Constitutional Crisis
Just three years later, on October 1, 2017, the Catalonian parliament held an official referendum readdressing whether Catalans still
wanted to secede from Spain through a unilateral declaration of independence.41 This vote heavily supported separation from Spain, leading the Catalonian government to declare independence from Spain.42
Spain responded by imposing direct rule over Catalonia using Article
155 of Spain’s Constitution.43 Article 155 gives Spain the right to impose direct rule in “a crisis on any of the country’s semi autonomous
regions.”44 Spanish law also states that elections must be held within
six months of Article 155 being invoked.45 Spanish Prime Minister,
Mariano Rajoy, stated that those elections needed to be “held much
36.

Comella, supra note 9, at 578 (“The rules on amendment specify that there must first
be a supermajority in parliament that agrees to introduce a particular change. Only
then is a referendum possible (or required). If a referendum were added at the initial
stage, before there was any supermajority agreement in parliament, it would be hard to
preserve the spirit of consenso.”).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. (“The Constitution, in particular, can be revised in many different directions, and
there is no substantive limit
to the changes that may be brought about through constitutional means.”).
40. Id.
41. Catalonia
profile
Timeline,
BBC
NEWS
(Dec.
25,
2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20345073 (this followed the court barring the
former Catalonia President, Artur Mas, from public office for two years following the
unofficial referendum that took place in 2014).
42. Id.
43. Catalonia independence: Spain pushes to remove leaders, BBC NEWS (Oct. 21,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41704759.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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sooner.”46 The elections were held on December 21, 2017 and resulted in an increasingly large amount of support for secessionist politicians, giving them a slim majority of parliament.47 Now, more than
ever, Catalonia and Spain need to discuss the legality of Catalonia’s
decision to unilaterally secede from Spain and can look to other international court decisions for guidance.
The Canadian Supreme Court Ruling on Quebec
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada made a decision regarding Quebec’s attempt at secession, known as the Reference Re Secession of Quebec.48 During this discussion, the court was required to
answer three questions:
(1) Does Quebec have the right to secede unilaterally from Canada under Canada’s constitution?
(2) Does Quebec have the right to secede unilaterally from Canada under international law?
(3) If Canadian law and international law conflict, which law
takes precedence in this case?49
The reference questions were not calling upon the Canadian Supreme Court to “usurp any democratic decision that the people of
Quebec may be called upon to make.”50 The court emphasized that
these questions “are strictly limited to aspects of the legal framework
in which that democratic decision is to be taken.”51 In answering
these questions, the Canadian Supreme Court looked to two guiding
principles: (1) the right to self determination; and (2) territorial integ46.

47.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. (Catalan secessionists claim that Spain has “suspended democracy.” Barcelona
Mayor Ada Colau called the Spanish government’s decision a “serious attack on the
rights and freedoms of all, both here and elsewhere” while calling for demonstrations).
Reuters Staff, Former Catalan leader urges Spain to accept secessionist election win,
REUTERS (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politicscatalonia/former-catalan-leader-urges-spain-to-accept-secessionist-election-winidUSKBN1EO0K6 (Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy called for the Catalan parliament to be formed on January 17, 2018. Although this was expected to be a long,
drawn-out process of forming a government, no such government has materialized).
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1342.
Id.
Id. at 1346.
Id. (“Since the reference questions may clearly be interpreted as directed to legal issues, the Court is in a position to answer them . . . The questions raise issues of fundamental public importance and they are not too imprecise or ambiguous so as not to
permit a proper legal answer.”).

273

2018

University of Baltimore School of Law

rity.52 Without these two concepts, the Canadian Supreme Court
would not have determined the cornerstones in the evaluation of unilateral declarations of independence.53
The court ruled that “Quebec could not, despite a clear referendum result, purport to invoke a right of self-determination to dictate
the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties to the federation.”54 The Canadian Constitution provides that a democratic vote
cannot supersede the rule of law and principles of federalism, as well
as rights of minorities and individuals, or democracy in Canada.55
This means that a mere vote by the people, official or not, would
have no bearing on whether there is a right to secession under selfdetermination. However, a clear will of the people would place an
obligation on both other provinces and the federal government to enter into a negotiation with “underlying constitutional principles” to
resolve issues such as secession.56 The Canadian Supreme Court
viewed the Constitution as more than a written text.57 The court determined that “the principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities” must be taken
into consideration.58 The identification of these underlying issues
would be more likely to lead to a mutually beneficial resolution.
The Canadian Supreme Court went so far as to address the negotiation process between Quebec and Canada.59 The Canadian Su52.
53.
54.
55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

Id. at 1342.
Id.
Id. at 1344.
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1343 (“Democratic rights under
the Constitution cannot be divorced from constitutional obligations. Nor, however, can
the reverse proposition be accepted: the continued existence and operation of the Canadian constitutional order could not be indifferent to a clear expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada.”).
Id. (“The other provinces and the federal government would have no basis to deny the
right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession should a clear majority of the
people of Quebec choose that goal, so long as in doing so, Quebec respects the rights
of others.”).
Id. (The Canadian Supreme Court explained that the Constitution “embraces the entire
global system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional authority.” Interpreting the Constitution in a superficial manner would likely be misleading).
Id. (“Those principles must inform our overall appreciation of the constitutional rights
and obligations that would come into play in the event that a clear majority of Quebecers votes on a clear question in favour of secession.”).
Id. at 1343.
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preme Court found that “[t]he Court has no supervisory role over the
political aspects of constitutional negotiations.”60 The Court did not
step into such matters as they did not wish to “usurp the prerogatives
of the political forces that operate” within the constitutional framework.61 Clearly, the Canadian Supreme Court will only step in as a
last resort to these types of problems.62 In outlining negotiations that
would follow a vote in favor of secession, the Court emphasized that
the law would not lead to predetermined conclusions on any issue. 63
The court noted, “Negotiations would need to address the interests of
the other provinces, the federal government, Quebec and indeed the
rights of all Canadians both within and outside Quebec, and specifically the rights of minorities to ensure fair treatment during the implementation of a secession.”64
When it examined international law, the Canadian Court found
that secession may arise under the principle of self-determination in
three circumstances:
(1) When ‘a people’ is governed as a part of a colonial empire;
(2) Where ‘a people’ is subject to alien subjugation, domination
or exploitation;
(3) Where ‘a people’ is denied any meaningful exercise of its
right to self-determination within the state of which it forms a part.65
It is important to note that “a people” was not concretely defined
within the scope of international law.66 However, the Canadian Supreme Court determined that whatever the correct definition of “a
people” would be in this scenario, “their right of self-determination
cannot in the present circumstances be said to ground a right to unilateral secession.”67 The Canadian Supreme Court found no existence
of human rights violations, mistreatment by the Canadian government, or a situation that would have kept people in Quebec from their
60.
61.
62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 1344.
See Id. at 1366 (“The reconciliation of the various legitimate constitutional interests is
necessarily committed to the political rather than the judicial realm precisely because
that reconciliation can only be achieved through the give and take of political negotiations.”).
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1344.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1370.
Id.
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fundamental rights, especially to that of self-determination.68 The Canadian Supreme Court ultimately concluded that there was no existing conflict between Canadian and international law that needed to be
addressed.69
On the other hand, the Canadian Supreme Court found that it is
possible there are other circumstances that constitute secession, even
when the provinces are not considered to be oppressed, subjugated, or
exploited.70 This means self-determination is possible within the
framework of an existing state.71 The court explained that:
“A state whose government represents the whole of the people or
peoples resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without
discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its
internal arrangements, is entitled to maintain its territorial integrity
under international law and to have that territorial integrity recognized by other states.”72
Where the right to self-determination is possible, it must be exercised “consistently with the territorial integrity of states.”73 The Supreme Court of Canada essentially determined that self-determination
and territorial integrity cannot exist without one another.74 The court
found that Quebec did not meet the criteria for being considered either a colonial people or an oppressed people.75 They were also not
68.
69.

70.
71.

72.
73.

74.
75.

Id. at 1344. (In reaching this conclusion, the Canadian Supreme Court looked to the
three situations under which self-determination would be allowed).
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1368 (“International law contains
neither a right of unilateral secession nor the explicit denial of such a right, although
such a denial is, to some extent, implicit in the exceptional circumstances required for
secession to be permitted under the right of a people to self-determination.”)
Id. at 1369.
Id. (Self-determination is now such a widely known concept in the international
community that “international law expects that the right to self-determination will be
exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states.” Where operating
within the framework of an existing sovereign state is not possible, as seen in the situations discussed above, a right of secession could arise).
Id.
Id. (In international law, the principle of self-determination has grown over time within a framework that respects the territorial integrity of existing states. Typically, international documents that support a right to self-determination also support that exercising such a right must be limited. This is done to prevent threats to the territorial
integrity of an existing state or to maintain stable relations between states that are already sovereign).
Id.
Id.
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denied meaningful access by the government to pursue economic,
cultural, political, and social development.76 This conclusion lead to
the ruling that Quebec did not have the right under international law
to unilaterally secede from Canada.77
The International Court of Justice Ruling on Kosovo
On July 22, 2010 the International Court of Justice ruled that
Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia in February 2008
was legal under international law.78 Judge Hisashi Owada, president
of the ICJ, stated that, “The court considers that general international
law contains no applicable prohibition of declaration of independence.”79 In addressing the unilateral declaration of independence of
Kosovo from Serbia, both the ICJ and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter “NATO”) analyzed existing international law regarding the right to self-determination and the concept of territorial
integrity by utilizing several international legal sources to support
their conclusions.80

76.

77.

78.

79.
80.

Id. (The court found that “such exceptional circumstances are manifestly inapplicable
to Quebec under existing conditions. Accordingly, neither the population of the province of Quebec, even if characterized in terms of “people” or “peoples”, nor its representative institutions, the National Assembly, the legislature or government of Quebec,
possess a right, under international law, to secede unilaterally from Canada.”)
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1370 (“Although there is no right,
under the Constitution or at international law, to unilateral secession, the possibility of
an unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a de facto secession is not ruled
out. The ultimate success of such a secession would be dependent on recognition by
the international community, which is likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of
secession having regard to, amongst other facts, the conduct of Quebec and Canada, in
determining whether to grant or withhold recognition. Even if granted, such recognition would not, however, provide any retroactive justification for the act of secession,
either under the Constitution of Canada or at international law.”).
Reed Stevenson & Adam Tanner, Kosovo independence declaration deemed legal,
REUTERS (July 21, 2010), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-kosovo/kosovoindependence-declaration-deemed-legal-idUSTRE66L01720100722 (much to the chagrin of Serbian President Boris Tadic, who insisted that Serbia would never recognize
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence).
Id.
Accordance, supra note 7 at ¶ 80 (quoting Article 1, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
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The legal decision in Kosovo was heavily rooted within the
United Nations charter, more specifically, Article 1(2).81 The principle of self-determination is first explicitly discussed in Article 1(2),
which explains that one of the primary purposes of the United Nations (hereinafter “UN”) is “‘to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples.’”82 Without the respect of those rights and
principles there is no way to move forward in situations involving the
unilateral secession. The UN’s discussion of self-determination was
made in the “context of friendly relations among nations and in conjunction with ‘equal rights’ of peoples.” 83 NATO also stated that the
UN Charter should be read with the knowledge that it is impossible to
achieve universal peace without self-determination.84
This NATO report takes the opportunity to define self-determination as it applies to issues of unilateral secession. The NATO report defines self-determination
as:

An essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance
of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening
of those rights. Furthermore, self-determination is defined as an inalienable right of all peoples and imposes corresponding obligations,
and the rights and . . . obligations concerning its implementation are
interrelated with other provisions and rules of international law.85
This means that the right to self-determination comes into play in
situations where individuals’ rights are not being observed and main-

81.

82.

83.

84.
85.

North Atlantic Treaty Org. [NATO], The Kosovo Crisis in an International Law Perspective: Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and the NATO Intervention, Final
Report, at 8, 9 (June 16, 2001), https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/kumbaro.pdf
[Hereinafter The Kosovo Crisis].
The Kosovo Crisis, supra note 82, at 10 (the report also discusses Article 55 as it is
applicable to Kosovo:” Article 55 instructs the UN to promote higher standards of living, solutions to health and cultural problems, and universal respect for human rights
“with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples.”).
Id. at 11 (it is important to note that the UN Charter, as a whole, is not comprehensive
in addressing either external or internal self-determination. The UN Charter refers to it
only as a “principle” rather than a “right”).
Id.
Id. at 13; See General Comment UN DOC. CCPR/C/21/Add.3. 24 at para. 2 (the right
of self-determination seen here is considered by the UN as a universal right).
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tained.86 Additionally, NATO found that such a right is absolute and
imposing that right comes with certain obligations. It is within the
aforementioned context and definitional analysis that a court must determine if a province or region has the right to unilaterally declare independence and secede.87
The ICJ recognized that the right of self-determination is for “the
peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien
subjugation, domination, and exploitation.”88 However, the ICJ clarified that those types of rights are typically only relevant in instances
of either colonialism or the independence of once-colonial territories.89 It is important to note that the ICJ explicitly states that in States
where those situations do not exist, that it “does not point to the
emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting the making
of a declaration of independence in such cases.”90 Even though the
UN Security Council has issued resolutions denouncing situations involving unilateral declarations of independence, those resolutions
were only made in situations involving unlawful use of force or other
international law violations.91 In the case of Kosovo, the court determined that Serbia had been exerting an unlawful use of force on the
people of Kosovo in a way that violated their rights.92 After analyzing
these violations, the ICJ ruled that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of

86.

87.

88.

89.
90.

91.
92.

Id. (“All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. “ INT’L COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, UNGA, Dec.
19, 1966, art. 1).
Id. (The report determines that “every people or nation is free to establish its own political institutions, to develop its own economic resources, and to direct its own social
and cultural evolution, without the interference of other peoples or nations.”).
Accordance, supra note 7, at 436 (Meaning self-determination is for people that are
under the control of non-citizens or foreigners in a way that violates their basic human
rights).
Id.
Id. (It is of equal importance to note that “a great many new States have come into
existence as a result of the exercise of this right. There were, however, also instances
of declarations of independence outside this context.”).
Id. at 437.
Id (For violations of human rights in Kosovo, See generally, U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Kosovo 2016 Human Rights Report
(2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265648.pdf.).
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independence from Serbia was not a violation of general international
law.93
The ICJ also addressed the argument that the principle of territorial integrity creates a prohibition of unilateral declarations of independence.94 The ICJ pointed to Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which states: “All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”95 The international
community has found the scope of the principle of territorial integrity
to be “confined to the sphere of relations between States.”96
The analysis of territorial integrity continued with the examination of Security Council Resolution 1244 97 and The United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (hereinafter “UNMIK”),
which provided the constitutional framework for Kosovo in this situation.98 The UN Security Council Resolution granted the UNMIK
power to set up the constitutional framework for Kosovo.99 The Constitutional framework in the UNMIK was made to function “as part
of a specific legal order . . . which is applicable only in Kosovo and
the purpose of which is to regulate, during the interim phase . . . matters which would ordinarily be the subject of internal, rather than in-

93.

94.
95.

96.
97.
98.

99.

Id. (“the illegality attached to the [previously addressed] declarations of independence
[by the ICJ] thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as
such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in
particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens). In the context of Kosovo, the
Security Council has never taken this position.”).
Accordance, supra note 7, at 437.
Id.; U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2 (Territorial integrity exists in situations involving unilateral declarations of independence in instances where a nation has acted inconsistently
with the purposes of the United Nations).
Id.
Id. at 440-4.
Id. at 439-42 (The UNMIK created a constitutional framework for Kosovo that “took
effect as part of the body of law adopted for the administration of Kosovo during the
interim phase. The institutions which it created were empowered by the Constitutional
Framework to take decisions which took effect within that body of law. In particular,
the Assembly of Kosovo was empowered to adopt legislation which would have the
force of law within that legal order, subject always to the overriding authority of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General”).
Id. (The ICJ was brought in to address “the question whether the authors of the declaration of independence acted in violation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)”).
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ternational, law.”100 The ICJ concluded that neither document prohibited the unilateral declaration of independence from Kosovo,
meaning there was no violation of international law.101
THE POWER OF PERSUASION (IN TERMS OF OTHER COURT
RULINGS)
The Canadian Supreme Court’s Ruling and its Ramifications on
Catalonia
In applying the Canadian Supreme Court’s ruling on Quebec to
the current situation in Catalonia look at the findings made about the
right to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity.
The Canadian Supreme Court held that clear referendum results do
not automatically mean that a province has the right to selfdetermination.102 It is evident that the Catalonian referendum was
largely in favor of unilateral secession from Spain,103 but if the court
looks to the Canadian precedent, that vote does not guarantee selfdetermination for those voters. The vote is merely an expression of
the will of the people, which it is not mandatory for Spain to honor.
According to Reference re Secession of Quebec, there are three possible for situational criteria which could justify a declaration of selfdetermination.104 Although Catalonia has a history of fighting for independence from Spain, the region itself was never oppressed or colonized.105 This means that Catalonia has already failed to meet two100. Id. at 440.
101. Accordance, supra note 7, at 452-3 (“The Court has concluded above that the adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Framework. Consequently, the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable
rule of international law.”).
102. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1344.
103. Catalan referendum: preliminary results show 90% in favour of independence, supra
note 1.
104. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1344.
105. Catalan Crisis: Why does Catalonia want independence? Do the majority really support
it?,
INDEPENDENT,
Oct.
29,
2017,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalan-crisis-why-does-cataloniawant-independence-do-people-really-support-it-spain-latest-a8025836.html
((“For
decades the Catalans suffered under [Francisco Franco’s] harsh rule as political opposition was violently suppressed as well as their autonomy, language and culture. Their
regional government was only restored in 1979, four years after his death.” So the Catalans are not currently facing any sort of subjugation or oppression like they have previously).
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out-of-three possible criteria identified by the Canadian Supreme
Court that would allow for a unilateral secession and declaration of
independence from Spain.
In Reference re Secession of Quebec, the Canadian Supreme
Court reached the conclusion that territorial integrity could not exist
without being exercised alongside self-determination.106 This means
that Catalonia could potentially meet the required standard for selfdetermination within the framework of their already-existing state.107
If the Spanish government denied the Catalonians the right to pursue
political, economic, social or cultural development, that could provide a basis for a unilateral secession by Catalonia.108 However, there
is no evidence that Catalans are being denied any such rights.109 Catalonians are allowed their own government, economy, and language,
which separates them from Spain.110 It also helps to maintain the
growth of their own society and culture.111 The Spanish government
is merely trying to keep Catalonia from seceding on the grounds that
such a secession would violate international law and be detrimental,
not only to Catalonia, but to other regions in Spain.112
The Canadian Supreme Court also determined that territorial integrity prohibits any unilateral secession unless the circumstances
meet the criteria that could trigger the right of self-determination.113
“International law places great importance on the territorial integrity
of nation states and, by and large, leaves the creation of a new state to
be determined by the domestic law of the existing state of which the
seceding entity presently forms a part.”114 Catalonia would essentially
106. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1369.
107. Id. (“A state whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples resident
within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and respects the
principles of self-determination in its own internal arrangements, is entitled to the protection under international law of its territorial integrity.”).
108. Id.
109. Catalan Crisis, supra note 106.
110. Id.
111. Id. (“Catalonia has always seen itself as separate from the rest of Spain as it has historically had its own regional government.”).
112. Id. (“Catalonia is the richest region in Spain and if it successfully seceded Madrid
could lose 20 per cent of its GDP.”).
113. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1344.
114. Id. at 1372 (In regards to Quebec, “unilateral secession would be incompatible with
the domestic Constitution, international law is likely to accept that conclusion subject
to the right of peoples to self-determination”).
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have to look at the rules governing the entirety of Spain to influence
their own domestic legal choices. The emphasis would be placed on
Catalonia’s ability to take the Spanish Constitution and apply it to
their own situation in a manner that works out in their favor. However, given that Catalonia has not managed to apply the law in an effective way, it is likely that they would not succeed if they were to seek
unilateral secession in the same manner. Catalonia does not meet any
of the requirements needed to invoke self-determination under territorial integrity, which would also likely would prohibit Catalonia from
making a unilateral declaration of independence.
As seen in Reference re Secession of Quebec, Catalonia’s only
hope to invoke the right of self-determination would be with Spain’s
authorization of that right. Unfortunately, this path is not an option as
Spain has already ruled multiple times that Catalonia does not have a
right to either declare independence or an ability to unilaterally secede.115 Catalonia does not meet the criteria needed to invoke the
right of self-determination or territorial integrity. In analyzing and
applying the court ruling in Reference re Secession of Quebec, it is
clear that under international law, Catalonia does not have a right to
unilaterally secede from Spain. Catalonia would also likely not be
successful and in making a unilateral declaration of independence.
The International Court of Justice’s Ruling and its Ramifications
on Catalonia
In order to address the situation in Kosovo, the ICJ asked itself
the following question: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence
by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”116 To both answer that question and
apply the ruling on Kosovo’s unilateral secession from Serbia and the
current situation in Catalonia, emphasis must be placed upon the
115. Comella, supra note 9, at 572 (“The Spanish Court, in contrast [to the Canadian Supreme Court], derived two consequences from the idea that the Spanish people is sovereign: Catalonia cannot secede unilaterally, and it cannot hold a referendum on independence unilaterally.”).
116. Accordance, supra note 7, at 423 (It is important to not the following: “the question is
narrow and specific; it asks for the Court’s opinion on whether or not the declaration
of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask about the legal
consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not Kosovo
has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as an independent State.”).
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ICJ’s analysis of self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity. In regards to Kosovo, the ICJ found that the right to selfdetermination was present in situations where people had been exploited, subjugated and dominated.117 Although they have spent many
years fighting for their independence, Catalans have not been treated
with colonialism by the Spanish government, nor have they been oppressed since their regional government was restored in 1979.118 They
have been allowed to thrive economically and contribute greatly to
the overall welfare of Spain while running their own government. 119
Catalans are simply attempting to secede because they believe that
they are not receiving the amount of freedom or independence from
Spain that they feel they deserve.120
The ICJ has also explained that, in terms of United Nations’
sanctions, the right to self-determination was only prohibited in instances where other violations of international law or an abusive use
of force were present.121 Spain has, until recently, increased their police presence and threatened to take control of Catalonia using Article
155.122 However, Spain is allowed to exert control over a province in
the event of a crisis:
(1) “If a Self-governing Community does not fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the Constitution or other laws, or acts in a
way that is seriously prejudicial to the general interest of Spain, the
Government, after having lodged a complaint with the President of
the Self-governing Community and failed to receive satisfaction
therefore, may, following approval granted by the overall majority of
the Senate, take all measures necessary to compel the Community to

117. Accordance, supra note 7, at 436.
118. Catalan Crisis, supra note 106.
119. Id. ((However, their contribution to the overall welfare of Spain means that “many
Catalans feel they are paying high taxes and suffering under austerity to shore up the
profligacy of a country they have little in common with. A large proportion believe
they will be wealthier and more successful if they go it alone in future.”).
120. The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s ‘Right to Decide’, supra
note 9, at 573.
121. Accordance, supra note 7, at 436 (“The illegality attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such,
but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use
of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character.”).
122. Catalonia independence: Spain pushes to remove leaders, supra note 43.
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meet said obligations, or to protect the abovementioned general interest.
(2) To execute the measures foreseen in the previous section,
the government may give instructions to all of the authorities in
the autonomous communities.”123
The fact that Article 155 is written into the Spanish Constitution
grants them power to impose direct control over a region that is going
through a crisis, much like Catalonia is now. The article directly
highlights that there is no abuse of force here, but rather, and invocation of the right to control. The ongoing public demonstrations, boycotting, and marches held within Catalonia reveal that the province is
facing a crisis of political unrest that does not appear to be going
away any time soon.124 Under Article 155, the Spanish government
should be allowed to rule over Catalonia until either some of the violence can be quelled or there are successful negotiations between the
pro-unity and secessionist parties.
In addressing the issue of territorial integrity, the ICJ differs
from the Canadian Supreme Court’s ruling.125 Here, the ICJ held that
territorial integrity does not automatically prohibit unilateral declarations of independence.126 However, under the ICJ’s advisory opinion,
it is not likely that Catalonia will have as strong an argument as Kosovo did in terms of the constitutionality of their claim to independence.127 Kosovo’s constitutional framework was set up by the
UNMIK and did not prohibit a declaration of independence. 128 The
framework itself was set up as a way to start Kosovo with a “clean
slate” and to address the issues they faced while still a part of Ser123. SPANISH CONST. Dec. 27, 1978, art. 155.
124. Catalan Crisis, supra note 106 (Also, there does not seem to be an immediate risk of
military forces being deployed into the street. However, given that political leaders of
the secessionist movement have been arrested or are in asylum, if negotiations do not
take place, it is likely that the military will eventually have to get involved).
125. Accordance, supra note 7, at 437 (“The question put to the Supreme Court of Canada
inquired whether there was a right to “effect secession”, and whether there was a rule
of international law which conferred a positive entitlement on any of the organs
named. By contrast, the General Assembly [in addressing Kosovo] has asked whether
the declaration of independence was “in accordance with” international law.”).
126. Id.
127. See generally Accordance, supra note 7 (as previously stated, there was no human
rights violations or subjugation of the Catalans by the Spanish government, which was
the case with Serbia and Kosovo).
128. Id.
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bia.129 In regards to Catalonia, the Spanish Constitution deemed the
October 1 referendum, which would have legitimized a declaration of
independence from Spain, to be unconstitutional.130 This further complicates matters for Catalonia because they are unable to make a unilateral declaration through such an explicit and simple declaration as
was the case in Kosovo.131 At this point there is no simple way for
Catalonia to make a declaration of independence from Spain, as neither a referendum nor an explicit declaration is allowed under the rulings of the Spanish Constitutional Court.132
It is not possible to achieve peace without self-determination under the United Nations Charter.133 For Catalonia, this means that there
will likely be no peace between the Catalans and the Spanish government until they negotiate a path for self-determination for Catalonia.134 Additionally, NATO’s report on Kosovo held that selfdetermination is a right of all peoples and must be mindful in terms
of international law, which is at issue today in Catalonia.135 Although,
self-determination is a right, it is not guaranteed to go into effect unless the proper criteria are satisfied.136 This criterion can be constitutional, procedural or even regulatory and must be examined on a
case-by-case basis. In the case of Catalonia, certain constitutional requirements and provisions would need to be met in order for Spain to
allow them to secede.137 Any court could consciously decide to use
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

136.
137.

Id. at 426.
Catalonia independence: Spain pushes to remove leaders, supra note 43.
Accordance, supra note 7, at 426.
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1344.
The Kosovo Crisis in an International Law Perspective: Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and the NATO Intervention, supra note 82, at 11.
See generally Accordance, supra note 7.
See generally The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s ‘Right to Decide’, supra note 9 (“There are no constitutional principles that are immune against
modification through the applicable procedures of revision. Even the principles that establish the unity of Spain and the sovereignty of the Spanish people can be altered in
the future through the pertinent amendment. Indeed, if the Spanish people, legally
speaking, only exists as a creature of the Constitution, there is no limit to the kinds of
transformations that the Spanish people can undergo in the future, including its partial
fragmentation. Secession is therefore not excluded as a legal possibility.”).
See generally Accordance, supra note 7.
The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s ‘Right to Decide’, supra
note 9, at 573 (“So if the ′right to decide′ means the future status of Catalonia is to be
exercised according to the existing constitutional framework, including the rules on
constitutional amendment, there is nothing legally wrong with it. It is merely a politi-
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the rationale implemented in the case of Kosovo to explore the legality of unilateral secession in another country.
In applying the ICJ’s advisory opinion on Kosovo to the case of
Catalonia, they cannot simply declare their independence nor do they
qualify to invoke the right to self-determination, with or without territorial integrity.138 Catalonia’s attempt to hold both unofficial and official referendums to achieve secession would not succeed based upon
the ICJ opinion on Kosovo.139 It is under that opinion that Catalonia
would also not qualify to invoke the right to self-determination as
their current status/relationship with Spain does not meet any of the
criterion.140 This means that Catalonia does not have the right to either declare independence or unilaterally secede from Spain under international law.141
What These Ramifications Mean for Catalonia
The responsibility has fallen upon Spain to handle this issue internally as other international bodies have declined to get involved
with the situation. This problem is of the utmost importance to Spain
because of the growing levels of violence and unrest currently displayed taking place on the international stage.142 The amount of media attention, not to mention the political attention, can lead to either
both or one of the parties to be internationally humiliated or can even
create tension in the international political realm. The Spanish Constitutional Court chose to take an almost contradictory stance on the

138.
139.

140.
141.

142.

cal ′aspiration′, the Court wrote, that can only be realized through the applicable constitutional procedures.”).
See generally Accordance, supra note 7.
Id. (In Kosovo, the unilateral action to declare independence could not be reconciled
with the UN Security Council resolution 1244. In Catalonia, the same unilateral action
also fails as it constitutes a violation of UN Security Council resolution 1244).
Id. (in applying the criterion previously discussed, Catalonia is not enacting a “remedial secession,” which was the situation in Kosovo).
Id. (Keeping in mind that this is the application of two recent international holdings
on this issue, it is possible that Catalonia could declare international independence or
unilaterally secede from Spain under Spanish law. This is depending upon whether the
Spanish Constitution/government would allow this to happen).
Catalan Crisis, supra note 106 (without a resolution to this situation, it is possible that
other states or nations around the world could decide to rise up and make a unilateral
declaration of independence for secession on their on. Internally, without a resolution,
Spain runs the risk of other autonomous communities attempted to unilaterally secede
as well. The political unrest in Catalonia alone is hard to keep at bay, but if more states
get involved Spain will have an even bigger problem on their hands).
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issue as an attempt to appease both Spain and Catalonia.143 This
means that the Spanish Constitutional Court needs to reach a more
concrete verdict, which can only be done by slowly and meticulously
looking over both the proposed manner of secession and the relative
articles within the Spanish Constitution.
If the Spanish Constitutional Court would not be willing to pass
a more concrete judgment, then Spain and Catalonia would have to
look to another court to resolve their issues, possibly involving the
United Nations in their attempt at resolution. Whichever court takes
on this case will also need to look to international examples such as
the aforementioned secession decisions regarding both Quebec and
Kosovo. Again, these opinions are not binding on the situation in
Catalonia, but can offer the court insight into how decisions regarding these matters are made. The cases of Kosovo and Quebec can offer the court key criteria to consider while evaluating the legality of
Catalonia’s unilateral secession of Spain. It is important to note that,
in order to be thorough and fair, whichever court addresses this issue
should look at the situation through both the lens of international law
and the lens of what is allowed under the Spanish Constitution.
Through the above analysis it is clear that Catalonia does not have the
legal right to unilaterally secede from Spain.

Conclusion
If it is found that Catalonia does have the international legal right
to unilaterally secede from Spain, it will set a precedent that could allow other Spanish provinces to pursue the same course of action. Not
only that, but this secession, if allowed, would clearly affect the economic, social, and cultural makeup of Spain as a country. If this sort
of change were to be allowed in Spain, it could potentially indicate to
other nations within states throughout the world that they too can secede. From the analysis of Quebec, Kosovo, and Catalonia a bigger
picture will be revealed regarding the circumstances under which a
nation can unilaterally secede from the state it is a part of.
143. The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s ‘Right to Decide’, supra
note 9 (“In order to reach unanimity, some intermediate solution had to be worked out.
Basically, the Court invalidated one part of the challenged Declaration, while it upheld
the other (provided, however, that the latter was read in a constitutionally proper manner)”).
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In analyzing the legal situation between Catalonia and Spain, it
is important to look at other similar situations for persuasive precedent. Through further analysis of the Canadian Supreme Court’s ruling on Quebec and the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo it is clear
that two prongs must be examined: (1) the right to self-determination;
and (2) territorial integrity.144 By looking at Reference re Secession of
Quebec, it is clear that in order to invoke the right of selfdetermination one must have been experiencing colonialism, subject
to domination, exploitation or subjugation or denied exercise of the
right to self determination.145 These criteria for invoking the right to
self-determination were also utilized in the ICJ Advisory Opinion on
Kosovo.146 It is clear that Catalonia cannot claim unilateral secession
under the principle of self-determination.
However, the courts addressing Quebec and Kosovo differ over
the application of the principle of territorial integrity. The Canadian
Supreme Court held that territorial integrity prohibits unilateral declarations of independence in situations where the right to selfdetermination does not exist.147 On the other hand, the ICJ found that
territorial integrity did not prohibit unilateral declarations of independence.148 In applying the ruling on Quebec it is clear that Catalonia cannot qualify for territorial integrity. Based upon the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion, Catalonia cannot simply declare their independence
nor do they qualify to invoke the right to self-determination, with or
without territorial integrity. This means that, in using either the Canadian Supreme Court or ICJ’s decision persuasively, Catalonia cannot make a unilateral declaration of independence and secession from
Spain under international law.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See generally Accordance, supra note 7.
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1344.
Accordance, supra note 7, at 436.
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1369.
Accordance, supra note 7, at 437; U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.
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